This paper analyzes bankruptcy games with nontransferable utility as a generalization of bankruptcy games with monetary payoffs. Following the game theoretic approach to NTU-bankruptcy problems, we study some appropriate properties and the core of NTU-bankruptcy games. Generalizing the core cover and the reasonable set to the class of NTU-games, we show that NTU-bankruptcy games are compromise stable and reasonable stable. Moreover, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for an NTU-bankruptcy rule to be game theoretic.
Introduction
A bankruptcy problem is an elementary allocation problem in which claimants have individual claims on an estate which cannot be satisfied together. Bankruptcy theory studies allocations of the estate among the claimants, taking into account the corresponding claims. In a bankruptcy problem with transferable utility (cf. O'Neill (1982) ), the estate and claims are of a monetary nature. These problems are well-studied, both from an axiomatic perspective and a game theoretic perspective. We refer to Thomson (2003) for an extensive survey, Thomson (2013) for recent advances, and Thomson (2015) for an update.
Dietzenbacher, Estévez-Fernández, Borm, and Hendrickx (2016) generalized monetary bankruptcy problems to bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility in which individual utility is represented in incompatible measures. The estate can take a more general shape and corresponds to a set of feasible utility allocations. Dietzenbacher et al. (2016) analyzed these NTU-bankruptcy problems from an axiomatic perspective by formulating appropriate properties for bankruptcy rules and studying their implications. In particular, they focused on proportionality, equality, and duality in bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility, which resulted in the proportional rule and the constrained relative equal awards rule. Orshan, Valenciano, and Zarzuelo (2003) analyzed NTU-bankruptcy problems from a game theoretic perspective by introducing an associated NTU-bankruptcy game. As pointed out by Estévez-Fernández, Borm, and Fiestras-Janeiro (2014) , coalitions can attain payoff allocations outside the estate in this game, which contradicts the original idea of O'Neill (1982) . They redefined NTU-bankruptcy games to stay in line with this original idea about 1 TU-bankruptcy games, while focusing on convexity and compromise stability. However, it turns out that their NTU-bankruptcy game does not straightforwardly generalize the original TU-bankruptcy game, since the attainable payoff allocations of subcoalitions are explicitly bounded by individual claims. This paper introduces a new model for bankruptcy games with nontransferable utility which both generalizes the model for TU-bankruptcy games and stays in line with the idea of O'Neill (1982) . Focusing on the structure of the core, we analyze NTU-bankruptcy games along the lines of Curiel, Maschler, and Tijs (1987) . Their results imply that TU-bankruptcy games are compromise stable, i.e. the core equals the core cover, and reasonable stable, i.e. the core equals the reasonable set. Generalizing the core, the core cover, and the reasonable set to the class of NTU-games, we show that NTU-bankruptcy games are compromise stable and reasonable stable as well. Curiel et al. (1987) also showed that a TU-bankruptcy rule is game theoretic if and only if it satisfies truncation invariance. This means that there exists a solution for TU-games which coincides on the class of bankruptcy games with a certain bankruptcy rule if and only if this bankruptcy rule satisfies truncation invariance. We generalize this characterization to rules for bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility. This paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 provides a formal overview of notions for bankruptcy games with transferable utility and bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility. Section 3 introduces the class of nonnegative games with nontransferable utility and generalizes some notions from TU-games to NTU-games. Section 4 introduces and analyzes a new model for NTU-bankruptcy games. In Section 5, we formulate some concluding remarks and point out some suggestions for future research.
Preliminaries

Bankruptcy Games with Transferable Utility
Let N be a nonempty and finite set of players. An order of N is a bijection σ : {1, . . . , |N |} → N . The set of all orders of N is denoted by Π(N ) and the set of all coalitions is denoted by 2 N = {S | S ⊆ N }. A transferable utility game is a pair (N, v) in which v : 2 N → R assigns to each coalition S ∈ 2 N its worth v(S) ∈ R such that v(∅) = 0. Let TU N denote the class of all transferable utility games with player set N . For convenience, we denote a TU-game by v ∈ TU N .
Let v ∈ TU N . The marginal vector M σ (v) ∈ R N corresponding to σ ∈ Π(N ) is for all n ∈ {1, . . . , |N |} given by
Let K(v) ∈ R N for all i ∈ N be given by
and let k(v) ∈ R N for all i ∈ N be given by
Let v ∈ TU N . The core is given by
the Weber set (cf. Weber (1988) ) is given by
the core cover (cf. Tijs and Lipperts (1982) ) is given by
and the reasonable set (cf. Gerard-Varet and Zamir (1987) ) is given by Shapley (1971) and Ichiishi (1981) ) if C(v) = W(v), and compromise stable (cf. Quant, Borm, Reijnierse, and Van Velzen (2005) ) if C(v) = CC(v) and CC(v) = ∅. We state the following result. Proof. Assume that v ∈ TU N is convex and compromise stable. Then we have C(v) = CC(v). Moreover, from convexity we know that min σ∈Π(N )
A bankruptcy problem with transferable utility (cf. O'Neill (1982) ) is a triple (N, E, c) in which N is a nonempty and finite set of claimants, E ∈ R + is the estate, and c ∈ R N + is the vector of claims of N on E for which i∈N c i ≥ E. Let TUBR N denote the class of all bankruptcy problems with transferable utility with claimant set N . For convenience, we denote a TU-bankruptcy problem by (E, c) ∈ TUBR N .
Let Curiel et al. (1987) showed that TU-bankruptcy games are convex and compromise stable. Quant et al. (2005) showed that a convex and compromise stable TU-game is strategically equivalent to a bankruptcy game.
Bankruptcy Problems with Nontransferable Utility
Let N be a nonempty and finite set of claimants. For any
-the upper contour set is given by UC(E) = {x ∈ R N + | ¬∃ y∈E,y =x : y ≥ x};
-the strong Pareto set is given by SP
Note that SP(E) = WP(E) ∩ UC(E).
A bankruptcy problem with nontransferable utility (cf. Dietzenbacher et al. (2016) ) is a triple (N, E, c) in which E ⊂ R N + is the estate satisfying the following conditions: -E is nonempty, closed, and bounded;
and c ∈ UC(E) is the vector of claims. Let BR N denote the class of all bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility with claimant set N . For convenience, we denote an NTUbankruptcy problem by (E, c) ∈ BR N . Note that 0 N ∈ E for all (E, c) ∈ BR N . Moreover, any TU-bankruptcy problem (E * , c) ∈ TUBR N can be written as an NTU-bankruptcy prob-
1 +2x 2 ≤ 36} and c = (3, 24). We have u E = (6, 18), which means thatĉ
Nonnegative Games with Nontransferable Utility
This section introduces nonnegative games with nontransferable utility and generalizes some notions for TU-games to this new model. Many classes of TU-games are nonnegative, e.g. cost savings games such as sequencing games and other operations research games, airport games, simple games, glove games, and bankruptcy games. This lower bound for the worth of coalitions arises naturally from the assumption that allocating nothing to a player corresponds to a payoff of zero utility, which implies for some allocation problems that negative utility payoffs do not have any interpretation. Following the same lines of reasoning, this lower bound can also be applied in the context of NTU-games.
Definition 3.1 (Nonnegative Game with Nontransferable Utility). A nonnegative game with nontransferable utility is a pair (N, V ) in which N is a nonempty and finite set of players, and V assigns to each nonempty coalition S ∈ 2 N \ {∅} a set of payoff allocations V (S) ⊂ R S + satisfying the following conditions:
-V (S) is nonempty, closed, and bounded;
+ denote the class of all monotonic nonnegative NTUgames with player set N . For convenience, we denote such an NTU-game by V ∈ NTU N + . Note that a nonnegative TU-game v ∈ TU N gives rise to the nonnegative NTU-game Otten, Borm, Peleg, and Tijs (1998) , we define the marginal vector M σ (V ) ∈ R N corresponding to σ ∈ Π(N ) for all n ∈ {1, . . . , |N |} by (1), . . . , σ(n)}) .
Note that the conditions on V imply that this maximum exists. As in the context of TUgames, the marginal contribution of a player in a certain order can be interpreted as its maximal payoff when joining its predecessors, which have already been allocated their marginal contributions. Inspired by Borm, Keiding, McLean, Oortwijn, and Tijs (1992) , we define K(V ) ∈ R N for all i ∈ N by
Note that the conditions on V imply that these maxima exist. As in the context of TU-games, K i (V ) can be interpreted as the maximal payoff of player i ∈ N within an allocation of V (N ) which is stable against a coalitional deviation of the other players together. Moreover, k i (V ) can be interpreted as the minimal right of player i ∈ N , the maximal payoff which can be obtained within some coalition S ∈ 2 N , with i ∈ S, when each other member j ∈ S \ {i} is allocated K j (V ).
Using these notions, we can generalize the core, the core cover, and the reasonable set to the context of NTU-games. Let V ∈ NTU N + . The (strong) core is defined by
the core cover is defined by
and the reasonable set is defined by
Proof. Let x ∈ C(V ). For all i ∈ N , we can write
Suppose that there exists an i ∈ N for which
Contrary to TU-games, the following example shows that the generalized reasonable set does not necessarily contain the core of an NTU-game.
Example 2.
Let N = {1, 2, 3} and consider the game V ∈ NTU N + which is for all S ∈ 2 N \ {∅} given by
All marginal vectors are presented below.
0 4 5 (1, 3, 2) 0 9 0 (2, 1, 3) 4 0 5 (2, 3, 1) 9 0 0 (3, 1, 2) 0 9 0 (3, 2, 1) 9 0 0
This means that the reasonable set is given by
One can verify that (2, 2, 9 − 2 √ 2) ∈ C(V ) \ R(V ). Hence, C(V ) ⊆ R(V ).
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Although the reasonable set does not necessarily contain the core, the minimal and maximal marginal contributions can still be considered as reasonable bounds for payoff allocations. For that reason, we introduce the notion of reasonable stability to describe games for which the core and the reasonable set coincide.
Note that reasonable stability is stronger than marginal convexity (cf. Hendrickx, Borm, and Timmer (2002) ), which requires that M σ (V ) ∈ C(V ) for all σ ∈ Π(N ). Moreover, in view of Proposition 2.1, reasonable stability is equivalent to the combination of convexity and compromise stability on the class of TU-games.
Bankruptcy Games with Nontransferable Utility
This section introduces and analyzes a new model for bankruptcy games with nontransferable utility. Orshan et al. (2003) introduced a first model for NTU-bankruptcy games. As pointed out by Estévez-Fernández et al. (2014) , coalitions can attain payoff allocations outside the estate in this game, which contradicts the original idea of O'Neill (1982) . They redefined NTU-bankruptcy games to stay in line with this original idea about TU-bankruptcy games. However, the following example shows that their NTU-bankruptcy game does not straightforwardly generalize the original TU-bankruptcy game. = (1, 2, 3) . The corresponding TU-bankruptcy game v E,c ∈ TU N is presented below. Next, we introduce a model for NTU-bankruptcy games which generalizes TU-bankruptcy games and simultaneously stays in line with the original idea of O'Neill (1982) . 
Note that V E,c (S) is indeed nonempty, closed, bounded and comprehensive for all S ∈ 2 N \ {∅}, since E is nonempty, closed, bounded and comprehensive. Moreover, V E,c is monotonic and V E,c (N ) = E. As in TU-bankruptcy games, coalitions can attain the payoff allocations within the estate in which the other players are allocated their claims. Contrary to the models of Orshan et al. (2003) and Estévez-Fernández et al. (2014) , every subgame of the new bankruptcy game is a bankruptcy game too, as is the case for TUbankruptcy games. For any NTU-game 
Hence, V E,c S ∈ NTU S + is a bankruptcy game.
The remainder of this section studies the relationship between the core, the core cover, and the reasonable set of NTU-bankruptcy games. For this, we need to find expressions for the upper and lower bounds of the core cover and the reasonable set. A useful observation for this analysis is that bankruptcy games are invariant under claim truncation.
For any bankruptcy game V E,c ∈ NTU N + , we define the vector m(E, c) ∈ R N + by m i (E, c) = max{x ∈ V E,c ({i})} for all i ∈ N . Together with the vector of truncated claims, this vector appears to play a central role in the bounds of the core cover of bankruptcy games.
Lemma 4.3.
Let (E, c) ∈ BR N . Then N ) ). This means that there exists a y ∈ V E,ĉ E (N ) for which
(ii) Let i ∈ N . We can write
. Then we know from Lemma 4.2 and (i)
From Lemma 3.1 and Example 2 we know that, contrary to TU-games, the core cover is not necessarily contained in the reasonable set of an NTU-game. Surprisingly, for the reasonable set of an NTU-bankruptcy game we find the same upper bound and lower bound as for its core cover, which means that the core cover and the reasonable set of an NTUbankruptcy game still coincide. 
Let n ∈ {2, . . . , |N |} be such thatσ(n) = i. Then we have (Mσ σ(1) (V E,ĉ E ), . . . , Mσ σ(n) (V E,ĉ E )) ∈ V E,ĉ E ({σ(1), . . . ,σ(n)}), which means that Mσ σ(1) (V E,ĉ E ), . . . , Mσ σ(n) (V E,ĉ E ),ĉ Ê σ(n+1) , . . . ,ĉ Ê σ(|N |) ∈ E.
Concluding Remarks
A solution for NTU-games corresponds on the class of bankruptcy games to a bankruptcy rule if and only if it assigns to any bankruptcy game a core element. The compromise value for NTU-games (cf. Borm et al. (1992) ) and the MC-value for monotonic NTU-games (cf. Otten et al. (1998) ) are such solutions. Future research could study the interpretation and axiomatic significance of these and other corresponding bankruptcy rules in more detail. The other way around, a bankruptcy rule is game theoretic if and only if it satisfies truncation invariance. The constrained relative equal awards rule (cf. Dietzenbacher et al. (2016) ) is such a bankruptcy rule. Future research could study the corresponding solutions for NTU-games in order to further extend the relation between NTU-bankruptcy problems and NTU-games.
